class: center, middle, inverse, title-slide .title[ #
Misinformation Exposure Beyond Traditional Feeds: Evidence from a WhatsApp Deactivation Experiment in Brazil
] .author[ ### Tiago Ventura, Rajeshwari Majumdar, Jonathan Nagler, and Joshua A. Tucker
Georgetown University & Center for Social Media and Politics, NYU
] .date[ ###
McCourt Faculty Seminar
12/04/2023
] --- layout: true <div class="my-footer"><span>Tiago Ventura (Georgetown University)                                               McCourt School Faculty Seminar</span></div> --- class:middle ### From Liberation to Turmoil: The Misinformation Turn .center[ <img src="output/time.png" width="100%" /> [From Liberation to Turmoil, Tucker et. al., 2019](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/671987) ] --- class: middle ### Insights <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **.red[Prevalence of misinformation]:** - People .red[aren’t] actually exposed to a lot of .red[**misinformation**] – but exposure is heavily concentrated. .midgrey[(Grinberg et. al., 2019, Guess et. al. 2019)] --- class:middle ### .center[1% of users represented 80% of exposure to Fake News on Twitter in 20216] .center[ <img src="gringer.png" width="90%" /> ] .center[[Grinberg et al., 2019](https://www.science.org/doi/pdf/10.1126/science.aau2706)] --- class: middle ### Insights <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> .red[**Prevalence of misinformation**]: - People aren’t actually exposed to a lot of misinformation – but exposure is heavily concentrated. .midgrey[(Grinberg et. al. 2019, Guess et. al. 2019)] <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **.red[Mixed results for effects on political attitudes]:** - Mixed evidence from deactivating users from Facebook on polarization .midgrey[(Asimovic et. al. 2022, Alcott et. al. 2020, Arcenaux and Ladd 2023)] - Null effects from Meta Election 2020 studies .midgrey[(Guess et al. 2023a,b; Nyhan et al. 2023)] - Null effects of exposure to misinformation campaigns from Russian bots on Twitter .midgrey[(Eady et al. 2023)] --- ### .center[Exposure to IRA Russian Misinformation on Twitter doesn’t lead to changes in attitudes] .center[ <img src="russian.png" width="70%" /> .center[[Eady et al., 2023](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-022-35576-9)] ] --- ### Insights <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> .red[**Prevalence of misinformation**]: - People aren’t actually exposed to a lot of misinformation – but exposure is heavily concentrated. .midgrey[(Grinberg et. al. 2019, Guess et. al. 2019)] <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> .red[**Downstream effects**]: - Mixed evidence from Deactivating users from Facebook .midgrey[(Asimovic et. al. 2022, Alcott et. al. 2020, Arcenaux and Ladd 2023)] - Meta Election 2020 studies .midgrey[(Guess et al. 2023a,b; Nyhan et al. 2023)] - Null effects of exposure to misinformation campaigns from Russian bots on Twitter .midgrey[(Eady et al. 2023)] <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **.red[Majority of scholarly work comes from Western countries]**: - Over 80% of existing studies on interventions to correct misinformation focus on Global North countries .midgrey[(Blair et. al. 2023, Badrinathan and Chauchard, 2023a)] - Despite the fact that the real-world effects of misinformation exposure may be more pronounced in these countries. --- class:middle <img src="nyt.png" width="100%" /> --- class:middle ## WhatsApp 101 -- .panelset.sideways[ .panel[.panel-name[WhatsApp] #### WhatsApp is a worldwide popular end-to-end encrypted messaging app allowing both .red[direct] and .red[group-based] communications with close to 2 billion around the world ] .panel[.panel-name[Usage in Brazil] - .red[66% of the Brazilian eligible voters] has a social media account, and .red[65% have an WhatsApp account] ([Datafolha 2018](http://media.folha.uol.com.br/datafolha/2018/10/27/44cc2204230d2fd45e18b039ee8c07a6.pdf)) – 150 million people in 2022. - Most used app for all purposes: .red[talk to family & friends, do business & pay bills, consume news, talk politics, among others] ([Reuters Institute, 2021](https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2021)). - Used by .red[48% of population to read news], despite having no “news feed” ([Reuters Institute, 2021](https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2021)) - Across the world, .red[Brazilians are the most concerned about misinformation]. And among the most active social media users - And .red[WhatsApp is the main social media application] where users report to see more misinformation. ] .panel[.panel-name[Effects on Politics] Several claims about the role of WhatsApp on offline attitudes and behaviors: - Powerful propaganda and organizational tool for political parties .midgrey[(Chauchard and Garimella, 2022; Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2021)] - Misinformation led episodes of offline violence against minority groups .midgrey[(Saha et al., 2021; Banaji et al., 2019)] - Voting behavior .midgrey[(Tardáguila et al., 2018; Mello, 2020)] ] ] --- <br> <br> <br> <br> <br> <br> <br> <br> .content-box-gray[Identify the causal effects of **.red[WhatsApp usage]** on **.red[exposure to online rumors]** and its downstream effects on **.red[belief accuracy]** and **.red[political attitudes]**] --- class: middle, inverse, center # WhatsApp Multimedia Constrained Deactivation --- class: middle ## Deactivation Studies .center[ <img src="deactivation_studies.png" width="90%" /> ] .pull-left[ .center[Facebook Deactivation in the US [(Alcott et al., 2020)](https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20190658)] ] .pull-right[ .center[Facebook Deactivation in Bosnia and Herzegovina [(Asimovic et. al, 2022)](https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2022819118)] ] f --- class: middle ### Our Experiment -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **Our Design:** Cut the primary channels through which users are exposed to misinformation and polarizing content: videos, images and audios .midgrey[(Machado et al., 2019; Resende et al., 2019; Garimella and Tyson, 2018; Garimella and Eckles, 2020; Batista Pereira et al., 2023).] -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **Experiment:** Offer respondents a monetary incentive to - Disable their automatic download of media on WhatsApp. - Do not purposefully click and watch any media on WhatsApp. -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **Treatment Period:** Three weeks: - **Start:** Three weeks before general election in Brazil. - **End:** three days after the voting day. -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **Outcomes:** - Exposure and Beliefs to online misinformation, - Outgroup polarization - Subjective well-being. -- --- class:center, middle, inverse # Overview of the Experiment --- class:middle .center[ <img src="output/research_design.png" width="120%" /> ] --- class:middle ### Overview of the Experiment .panelset.sideways[ .panel[.panel-name[Recruitment] **Method:** Facebook Ads targeting adults Brazil **Started Recruitment:** September 8th **Number of respondents:** 1,947 **Screening variables:** + Willingness to join: .red[1,8861 participants] + More 5min WhatsApp daily + Only WhatsApp mobile + More than 2 min to complete recruitment + other quality controls ] .panel[.panel-name[Treatment Assignment] **Start**: September 15. **Treatment**: - Turn off the automatic download. - Three .red[weeks] without consuming any multimedia. **Control**: Three .red[days] without consuming any multimedia. **Invited**: 1,135 respondents **Enrolled**: 773 respondents ] .panel[.panel-name[Deactivation] .center[ <img src="./output/iphone_deact.jpeg" width="40%" /> ] ] --- .panel[.panel-name[Intervention] .center[ <img src="./blur.jpg" width="60%" /> ] ] .panel[.panel-name[Compliance] **Compliance Tasks:** - Screenshots of WhatsApp storage intormation - Every week + final survey - After the first compliance check, the control group was re-activated ] .panel[.panel-name[Compliance II] .center[ <img src="./output/iphone_compliance.jpeg" width="40%" /> ] ] .panel[.panel-name[Outcomes] **Self-Reported Exposure and Accuracy Judgment** - False Rumors published on fact-checking webpages during the month of the experiment + True News stories headlines from mainstream media. **Polarization** - Affective polarization (Feeling Thermometer). - Social Polarization (Willingness to engage with outgroup voter). - Issue Polarization (Abortion, gun control, etc..). - Perceptions about ideological polarization ('Where do I observe the two main candidates?'). **Subjective Well-being** - How did you feel for the past three weeks? (Happy, Anxious, etc...). ] ## Recruitment and Power Analysis .panel[.panel-name[Power Analysis] .pull-left[ **Complete Responses:** 732. ] .pull-right[ **Attrition Rate:** 5.3%. ] .center[ <img src="./output/sims_with_covariate.png" width="100%" /> ] ] ] --- class:middle ## Hypotheses <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> H1: Deactivated users will report lower levels of previous exposure to FALSE rumors. .midgrey[(Machado et al., 2019; Resende et al., 2019; Garimella and Tyson, 2018; Garimella and Eckles, 2020; Batista Pereira et al., 2023).] <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> H2a: Deactivated will display a higher ability to accurately identify FALSE rumors. .midgrey[(Fazio et al., 2015; Dechêne et al., 2010; Pennycook et al., 2018)] <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> H2b Deactivated users will display lower levels of mainstream news knowledge. .midgrey[((Valenzuela et al., 2021; Rossini et al., 2021a))] <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> H3: Deactivated will display lower levels of outgroup political polarization. .midgrey[((Bail et al., 2018; Settle, 2018; Lelkes et al., 2017, Omundsmen et. al. 2021)] <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> H4: Deactivated will display higher levels of the aggregated index of subjective well-being. .midgrey[((Allcott et al., 2020; Asimovic et al., 2021; Vanman et al., 2018; Tromholt, 2016)] --- class: center, middle, inverse # Results --- ### First-Stage Results .center[ <img src="./output/models_compliance.png" width="90%" /> ] --- ### Effects on Exposure to Misinformation Rumors (H1) .center[ <img src="./output/exposure_h1.png" width="90%" /> ] --- ### Reduction in exposure is large for false news (H1) .center[ <img src="./output/difference_true_false_exposure.png" width="90%" /> ] --- ### Effects on Belief Accuracy (H2) .center[ <img src="./output/belief_accuracy_h2.png" width="90%" /> ] --- ### Effects on Polarization & Subjective Well-Being (H3 & H4) .center[ <img src="./output/pol_sw_index.png" width="90%" /> ] --- class: middle, inverse, center ## Additional Analyses (Non Pre-Registered) --- ### Exposure and Partisanship .center[ <img src="output/sif_exposure_bothparties_counter_pro.png" width="90%" /> ] --- ### Belief Accuracy Conditional on WhatsApp usage for Politics .center[ <img src="output/sif_het_use_whatsapp_fac.png" width="90%" /> ] --- ### Polarization Outcomes .center[ <img src="output/pol_outcomes.png" width="90%" /> ] --- class: middle ## Discussion -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **WhatsApp is an important vector through which voters receive misinformation in Brazil at .red[a higher rate] compared to true news.** -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **The null results provide support for a .red[minimalist view of the short-term causal effects] of exposure to misinformation on WhatsApp on political attitudes.** -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **Exposure to misinformation .red[does not] mechanically affect attitudes** -- --- class: middle ### Limitations -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **Scope conditions**: focus on direct effects of exposure to misinformation on WhatsApp & and short-term effects. -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **Our study does not** rule out the use of WhatsApp (and other messaging apps) as a mobilization and organizational tool by malicious actors. -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> Larger effect might exist exactly on **hard to reach population**. -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **Small effect size & power constraints** -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> Electoral context & role of **directional** motivated reasoning -- --- class: middle, inverse, center # Understanding Causal Effects of Social Media Usage: Multi-country Designs --- class: middle ## Multi-Country WhatsApp Deactivation -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> .red[**Experimental**] - Multi-Country Deactivation: Mexico, South Africa and India. (TPP Grant) - Contextual Diversity - New treatment arm: overall reduction on WhatsApp usage. -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> .red[**Computational**] - Developing a data donation pipeline for WhatsApp group data -- --- ## Global Social Media Usage Reduction .pull-left[ - Large-Scale Collaborative Project on Experimentally Reducing Social Media Usage - Platforms: Five major algorithmic-based platforms (No WhatsApp) - Open Collaboration: 76 Countries, more than 700 (potential) collaborators signed up - Outcomes: News Knowledge, Affective Polarization and Subjective Well-Being - Truly global, allowing for comparative perspective, contextual variation and heteregenous effects. ] .pull-right[ <br> <br> .center[ <img src="global.png" width="100%" /> ] ] --- class:middle, center, inverse # Thank you! ---