class: center, middle, inverse, title-slide .title[ #
The effects of WhatsApp on exposure to misinformation and political attitudes: Evidence from a multimedia-constrained deactivation experiment
] .author[ ### Tiago Ventura, Rajeshwari Majumdar, Jonathan Nagler, and Joshua A. Tucker
Center for Social Media and Politics, NYU
] .date[ ###
Laboratório de Ciência Computacional e Experimental - UFPE, 06/15/2023
] --- layout: true <div class="my-footer"><span>Tiago Ventura (CSMaP)                                 Laboratório de Ciência Computacional e Experimental - UFPE </span></div> --- class:middle ### From Liberation to Turmoil: The Misinformation Turn .center[ <img src="output/time.png" width="100%" /> [From Liberation to Turmoil, Tucker et. al., 2019](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/671987) ] --- class:middle, inverse ## Three insights from the recent literature on social media and misinformation. --- class: middle ## 1) People .red[aren’t] actually exposed to a lot of .red[misinformation] – but exposure is heavily concentrated. --- class:middle <img src="gringer.png" width="100%" /> .center[[Grinberg et al., 2019](https://www.science.org/doi/pdf/10.1126/science.aau2706)] --- class: middle ## 2) The downstream effects of exposure to misinformation on political atttitudes are .red[difficult to measure, often small in size, and context dependent]. --- class:middle ### .center[Exposure to IRA Russian Misinformation on Twitter doesn’t lead to changes in attitudes] .center[ <img src="russian.png" width="70%" /> .center[[Eady et al., 2023](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-022-35576-9)] ] --- class:middle ### .center[Causal effects of social media are context-dependent] .pull-left[ .middle[ <img src="alcott.png" width="100%" /> .center[Facebook Deactivation in the US [Alcott et al., 2020](https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20190658)] ] ] .pull-right[ .middle[ <img src="nejla.jpg" width="120%" /> .center[Facebook Deactivation in Bosnia and Herzegovina [Asimovic et. al, 2022](https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2022819118)] ] ] --- class:middle ## 3) Most of the scholarly evidence come from a .red[advanced democracies] and from a .red[few platforms] (mostly Twitter, and to some extent Facebook) --- class:middle .center[ <img src="nyt.png" width="100%" /> ] -- --- class:middle ## Today's Presentation -- .red[Research Problem:] What are the causal effect of WhatsApp usage on beliefs for misinformation and its downstream effects, particularly political polarization? -- .red[Design:] Multimedia-Constrained Deactivation Experiment on WhatsApp: - Incentivized participants to spent three weeks without accessing any multimedia (images, videos and audio) on WhatsApp. -- .red[Context:] Weeks before the 2022 Presidential Election in Brazil -- .red[Results:] - Substantive reduction in **exposure to popular misinformation rumors**. - Unable to detect small to moderate effects on **attitudes (belief accuracy and polarization)** -- --- ### Deactivation Studies on Facebook <img src="deactivation_studies.png" width="90%" /> .pull-left[.center[Facebook Deactivation in the US [Alcott et al., 2020](https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20190658)]] .pull-right[.center[Facebook Deactivation in Bosnia and Herzegovina [Asimovic et. al, 2022](https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2022819118)]] --- class: middle <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **Our Design:** Cut the primary channels through which users are exposed to misinformation and polarizing content: videos, images and audios .red[(Machado et al., 2019; Resende et al., 2019; Garimella and Tyson, 2018; Garimella and Eckles, 2020; Batista Pereira et al., 2023).] -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **Experiment:** Offer respondents a monetary incentive to - Disable their automatic download of media on WhatsApp. - Do not purposefully click and watch any media on WhatsApp. -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **Treatment Period:** Three weeks: - **Start:** Three weeks before general election in Brazil. - **End:** three days after the voting day. --- class:center, inverse, middle ## Overview of the Experiment --- ## Recruitment **Method:** Facebook Ads targeting adults Brazil **Started Recruitment:** September 8th **Number of respondents:** 1,947 **Screening variables:** + Willingness to join: .red[1,8861 participants] + More 5min WhatsApp daily + Only WhatsApp mobile + More than 2 min to complete recruitment + other quality controls --- ## Treatment Assignment .pull-left[ **Start**: September 15. **Treatment**: - Turn off the automatic download. - Three .red[weeks] without consuming any multimedia. **Control**: Three .red[days] without consuming any multimedia. **Invited**: 1,135 respondents **Completed**: 773 respondents ] .pull-right[ .center[ <img src="./output/iphone_deact.jpeg" width="80%" /> ] ] --- ## Compliance Checks .pull-left[ **Compliance Tasks:** - Screenshots of WhatsApp storage intormation - Every week + final survey - After the first compliance check, the control group was activated ] .pull-right[ .center[ <img src="./output/iphone_compliance.jpeg" width="80%" /> ] ] --- class:middle ## Outcomes -- **Self-Reported Exposure and Accuracy Judgment** - False Rumors published on fact-checking webpages during the month of the experiment + True News stories headlines from mainstream media. -- **Polarization** - Affective polarization (Feeling Thermometer). - Social Polarization (Willingness to engage with outgroup voter). - Issue Polarization (Abortion, gun control, etc..). - Perceptions about ideological polarization ('Where do I observe the two main candidates?'). -- **Subjective Well-being** - How did you feel for the past three weeks? (Happy, Anxious, etc...). -- --- class:middle ## Hypotheses H1: Deactivated users will report lower levels of previous exposure to FALSE rumors. H2a: Deactivated will display a higher ability to accurately identify FALSE rumors. H2b Deactivated users will display lower levels of mainstream news knowledge. H3: Deactivated will display lower levels of outgroup political polarization. H4: Deactivated will display higher levels of the aggregated index of subjective well-being. --- ## Recruitment and Power Analysis .pull-left[ **Complete Responses:** 732. ] .pull-right[ **Attrition Rate:** 5.3%. ] .center[ <img src="./output/sims_with_covariate.png" width="70%" /> ] --- class: center, middle, inverse # Results --- ### First-Stage Results .center[ <img src="./output/models_compliance.png" width="90%" /> ] --- ### Effects on Exposure to Misinformation Rumors (H1) .center[ <img src="./output/exposure_h1.png" width="90%" /> ] --- ### Reduction in exposure is large for false news (H1) .center[ <img src="./output/difference_true_false_exposure.png" width="90%" /> ] --- ### Effects on Belief Accuracy (H2) .center[ <img src="./output/belief_accuracy_h2.png" width="90%" /> ] --- ### Belief Accuracy Conditional on WhatsApp usage for Politics .center[ <img src="./output/sif_het_use_whatsapp_fac.png" width="90%" /> ] --- ### Effects on Polarization & Subjective Well-Being (H3 & H4) .center[ <img src="./output/pol_sw_index.png" width="90%" /> ] --- ### Polarization Outcomes .center[ <img src="./output/pol_outcomes.png" width="90%" /> ] --- class: middle ## Discussion -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **WhatsApp is an important vector through which voters receive misinformation in Brazil at .red[a higher rate] compared to true news.** -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **The null results provide support for a .red[minimalist view of the short-term causal effects] of exposure to misinformation on WhatsApp on political attitudes.** -- <svg viewBox="0 0 512 512" style="height:1em;position:relative;display:inline-block;top:.1em;" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <path d="M504 256C504 119 393 8 256 8S8 119 8 256s111 248 248 248 248-111 248-248zm-448 0c0-110.5 89.5-200 200-200s200 89.5 200 200-89.5 200-200 200S56 366.5 56 256zm72 20v-40c0-6.6 5.4-12 12-12h116v-67c0-10.7 12.9-16 20.5-8.5l99 99c4.7 4.7 4.7 12.3 0 17l-99 99c-7.6 7.6-20.5 2.2-20.5-8.5v-67H140c-6.6 0-12-5.4-12-12z"></path></svg> **Exposure to misinformation .red[does not] mechanically affect attitudes** -- --- class:middle ## Limitations -- - Scope conditions: focus on direct effects of WhatsApp. -- - Larger effect might exist exactly in hard to reach groups. -- - Small effect size vs power -- --- class: middle ## Next steps. -- ### Replication, Replication, Replication -- --- class:middle ## Extra points for discussion - Pre-Analysis plan - Pilot(s) - Interacting with participants - Costs of running a field experiment - Researching on a "natural science" style lab - PhD in the United States - Job Market - etc.. --- class:center, middle, inverse ## Obrigado!!